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Unidentified Orbital Debris:
The Case for a Market-Share
Liability Regime
BYMARK J. SUNDAHL, PH.D.*
Introduction
We stand today on the threshold of a new space age. Public
interest in space activity is strong and signs of vitality in space are
everywhere.1 The Space Shuttle continues to fly regularly, NASA's
program to explore Mars has been aggressive, and the construction of
the International Space Station has commenced.2 Private industry
also has a firm first foothold in space. Telecommunication
companies, for example, plan to envelop the Earth with satellite
constellations in order to make global wireless broadband Internet
access a practical reality! With the development of a reusable launch
vehicle, the cost of achieving orbit will fall and the full vigor of the
free market will be unleashed.4 At that point, various space
* J.D. candidate, Hastings College of the Law, 2001; Ph.D. (Classics), Brown
University, 2000; B.A., University of California, Los Angeles, 1993. I would like to
extend my gratitude to Professor Dr. Walter Flury of the European Space Agency for
providing me with the most recent scientific data on space debris. My thanks also go
to Scott Blumin for encouraging me to pursue my vision of the new space age. I
dedicate this Note to my wife and friend, Ms. Angela Bailey-Sundahl.
1. See Mars Trip is Declared a Success, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 9, 1997, Metro, at 1.
The NASA webcast of the Mars rover mission in 1997 was "the largest Internet event
in the history of the world." Id.
2. See Mission to Mars Gives New Life to Space Program, N.Y. TIMES, July 20,
1997, Late Ed. (Final), at A2. Admittedly, the string of NASA missions to Mars have
included some embarrassing failures. See Usha Lee McFarling, NASA Failures
Blamed on Policies, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 14,2000, at A3. Despite these setbacks, NASA
plans to persevere in the exploration of Mars. See Keay Davidson, Bouncing Back,
NASA Plans Mars Mission, S.F. EXAMINER, July 28,2000, at A15.
3. See ESA SPACE DEBRIS MITIGATION HANDBOOK, at 4.2-1, European Space
Agency (Release 1.0, 1999) [hereinafter ESA HANDBOOK].
4. A reusable launch vehicle, or RLV, does not rely on disposable rocket
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industries, such as meteor mining, zero gravity manufacturing, and
tourism, will emerge.'
Our fledgling space industry, however, faces a grave danger. The
volume of orbital debris has become so great that collisions are
already commonplace. As the debris population continues to grow,
the costs resulting from collisions will eventually smother the
industry.
The most effective way to protect the space industry from the
crushing costs of orbital debris is to internalize the costs so that those
who are responsible for creating the hazard pay for any damage to
innocent parties. This internalization can be achieved by assigning
liability to those responsible for creating the debris. The United
Nations Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by
Space Objects (Liability Convention) already internalizes some
debris-related costs by means of a fault-based liability regime for
damage caused by space objects.6 The Convention only partially
succeeds in internalizing debris-related costs, however, because its
provisions only reach damage caused by larger pieces of debris.7 The
scope of the Liability Convention is limited in this way because the
fault standard requires that the owner of the harmful space object be
identified. Identification, in turn, requires that the debris fragment be
boosters to break free of Earth's gravitational pull, as does the Space Shuttle. The
mass-production of RLVs may be close at hand due to the establishment of the X-
Prize, a privately funded contest which offers an award in excess of ten million dollars
to the inventor of the first RLV. See X PRIZE Foundation, X-Prize Homepage
(visited Mar. 5, 2000) <http://www.xprize.org>. Eighteen teams from around the
world have entered the competition and a winner is on the horizon. See id. The
aerospace establishment as well as entrepreneurs unaffiliated with the X-Prize have
also taken up the RLV challenge. See Erick Schonfeld, Going Long, FORTUNE, Mar.
20, 2000, at 172-92. Lockheed, for example, has developed a prototype RLV called
the X-33. See id. at 174.
Some private companies, including Martin Marrieta, General Dynamics,
McDonnell Douglas, and Space Services of Texas, already provide limited space
delivery services. See Christopher Myers and Jonathan Ball, Trends in Commercial
Space 1996: Space Transportation (visited Mar. 3, 2000)
<http://www.ta.doc.gov/space/tics/spctrans.htm>.
5. See Schonfeld, supra note 4, at 174, 179. In fact, space tourism has already
begun. See Former JPL Scientist to Visit Mir Space Station as Tourist, L.A. TIMES,
June 17, 2000, at B7. The first space tourist, Dennis Tito, will pay approximately
twenty million dollars to spend ten days on the rehabilitated Mir space station, now
owned by the Dutch company MirCorp. See id.
6. Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects,
art. III, Mar. 29, 1972, 24 U.S.T. 2389, T.I.A.S. No. 7762, 961 U.N.T.S. 187
[hereinafter Liability Convention].
7. See discussion infra Part III.
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continuously tracked from Earth throughout its orbital lifetime.
Currently, however, governments only track debris fragments with a
diameter over ten centimeters.8 Smaller fragments are not tracked
and therefore nobody can be held liable for any damage caused by
these fragments. This problem of identification is a very serious
matter because small objects make up by far the largest and most
dangerous class of debris. These objects already number in the
trillions and are ever increasing.
Market-share liability solves the unidentified orbital debris
problem. Market-share liability has been successfully applied in
situations where several parties contribute to a dangerous condition
but where no clear causal link ties a particular party to the harm
caused by the condition. This solution has been proposed by a
handful of commentators over the years but no mechanism for
imposing market-share liability in outer space has yet been devised.
This Note explores the threat of unidentified orbital debris and
proposes a mechanism for imposing a form of market-share liability.
Part I describes the nature of the unidentified debris threat. Part II
describes how various agencies track debris and explains the
limitations of debris identification. Part III discusses international
law relevant to space debris.9 Part IV exposes the weaknesses of
some previously proposed solutions to the unidentified debris
problem. Part V argues that market-share liability is the best way to
internalize the costs of unidentified debris damage. Finally, Part VI
proposes an amendment to the Liability Convention that applies
market-share liability to damage caused by unidentified orbital
debris.
This Note comes on the heels of UNISPACE III, the third
annual conference of the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful
Uses of Outer Space (UNCOPUOS), which took place in July 1999.1
At the meeting, the Scientific and Technical Subcommittee made
public the fruits of a five-year study of the orbital debris problem." In
8. See discussion infra Part II.
9. See generally Howard A. Baker, Space Debris: Law and Policy in the United
States, 60 U. COLO. L. REv. 55 (1989) (discussing United States space law and policy);
see also Jennifer M. Seymour, Containing a Cosmic Crisis: A Proposal for Curbing
the Perils of Space Debris, 10 GEO. INT'L ENvrL. L. REv. 891, 903-06 (1998).
10. See U.N. Office of Outerspace Affairs, UNISPACE III Homepage (visited
Mar. 4,2000) <http://www.un.org/events/unispace3/>.
11. See TECHNICAL REPORT ON SPACE DEBRIS, Scientific and Technical
Subcommittee of the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer
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April 1999, the European Space Agency also released a detailed
study of space debris and debris mitigation.2 These new studies will
provide the technical foundation for the next generation of orbital
debris scholarship. I was fortunate to have access to these sources
while writing this Note.
I. The Nature of the Debris Threat
The United Nations will only address the unidentified debris
problem when the international community is convinced that space
debris poses a significant threat to our future in space. This Part
describes the current state of the debris problem and explains how
this problem, if ignored, will eventually reach crisis levels.
A. The Debris Population
The phrase "space debris" refers to all non-functional man-made
space objects." There are four categories of debris: (1) inactive
payloads, (2) operational debris, (3) fragmentation debris, and (4)
microparticulate debris.'4 Inactive payloads are defunct satellites that
drift through space.'5 Operational debris includes anything released
into space during the course of a mission, such as spent rocket stages,
exploding bolts, and lens caps ejected prior to camera operation.'6
Fragmentation debris, which makes up the greatest segment of the
debris population, consists of fragments born of collisions and
explosions.'7 Microparticulate debris consists largely of paint chips
from deteriorating surfaces and particles created by the burning of
solid rocket fuels. 8
Debris can also be divided into three size groups: (1) "large"
Space, U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/720 [hereinafter TECHNICAL REPORT].
12. ESA HANDBOOK, supra note 3.
13. See TECHNICAL REPORT, supra note 11, at 2. The Technical Subcommittee
for UNCOPUOS defines debris as including "all man-made objects, including their
fragments and parts, whether their owners can be identified or not, in Earth orbit or
re-entering the dense layers of the atmosphere that are non-functional with no
reasonable expectation of their being able to assume or resume their intended
functions or any other functions for which they are or can be authorized." Id.
14. See Seymour, supra note 9, at 893; see also Delbert D. Smith, The Technical,
Legal, and Business Risks of Orbital Debris, 6 N.Y.U. ENV'TL. L.J. 50,52 (1997).
15. See id.
16. See id.
17. See id.; see also ESA HANDBOOK, supra note 3, at 2.2-1 to 2.2-4 (cataloguing
144 known space object fragmentations caused by explosions and collisions).
18. See id.
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objects with a diameter over ten centimeters, (2) "medium" objects
with a diameter between ten centimeters and one millimeter, and (3)
"small" objects less than one millimeter in diameter.19 As a result of
the almost 3900 space missions launched since 1957,20 there are now
approximately 15,100 "large" pieces of debris adrift in Low Earth
Orbit (LEO).2' Smaller debris is far more numerous: tens of millions
of "medium"-sized pieces of debris float in space while trillions of
"small" pieces wash across the orbits like waves of sand.'
Medium and small fragmentation debris is particularly dangerous
because this debris typically travels much faster than large debris and
can be shot in any direction by the explosive force of a collision.' An
individual piece of debris may reach speeds up to fifteen kilometers
per second (54,000 kilometers per hour).24 At this speed, a fragment
the size of a bullet could torpedo a space station or destroy a
satellite.' A much smaller fragment would easily pierce an
astronaut's suit. 6 Even small particles traveling at a relatively low
speed can over time degrade the surfaces of spacecraft components.
Disturbingly, ninety-nine percent of all orbital debris is composed of
this deadlier class of debris with a diameter under ten centimeters.2
B. The Risk of Collision
Any spacecraft that spends a significant amount of time in orbit
will inevitably collide with some type of debris.29 A partial list of
19. See Peter J. Limperis, Orbital Debris and the Spacefaring Nations, 15 ARIZ. J.
INT'L & COMp. LAW 319,322 (1998).
20. See ESA HANDBOOK, supra note 3, at 2.0-1.
21. See id. at 2A-1. The Low Earth Orbit (LEO) is the most heavily utilized
orbit. Objects in LEO orbit between 200 kilometers and 2000 kilometers above the
surface of the earth. In Geosynchronous Earth Orbit (GEO), spacecraft typically
orbit approximately 36,000 kilometers above the earth. Objects in GEO have orbital
periods of twenty-four hours, matching the Earth's rotational period, which allows
them to remain constantly positioned -within view of a chosen point on earth, such as
a communications station. See Limperis, supra note 19, at 320-21.
22. See ESA HANDBOOK, supra note 3, at 2.4-1.
23. See id. at 2.4-3.
24. See id. at 9.0-1.
25. See Richard Berkley, Space Law Versus Space Utilization: The Inhibition of
Private Industry in Outer Space, 15 Wis. INT'L L.J. 421, 431 (1997); see also Seymour,
supra note 9, at 896.
26. See id.
27. See Limperis, supra note 19, at 328.
28. See Seymour, supra note 9, at 910 n.146.
29. See Limperis, supra note 19, at 326. The probability of collision is a function
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orbital collisions and near collisions involving debris shows that the
danger is real?'
1. In July 1996, a fragment of the European Ariane rocket struck
the French Cerise spy satellite.31
2. Damage to Japan's Midori satellite was likely to have been
caused by debris.32
3. The Space Shuttle has had 27 windows damaged by debris
during 18 flights.33
4. In 1998, orbital debris destroyed the expended third stage of a
Minuteman 2 intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM)?'
5. The Hubble telescope's solar panels have been pierced
numerous times by debris.
6. The Space Shuttle took evasive maneuvers to avoid debris on
seven missions."
7. In 1997, both the ERS-1 satellite and the CNES spacecraft
SPOT-2 were forced to maneuver in order to avoid collision
with debris.37
8. Debris detectors placed in orbit to test debris density have
shown many thousands of craters.
9. Various other retrieved space objects have shown debris-
related degradation. 9
This list includes only those episodes which are known to have
involved debris. The unexplained malfunctions of a great number of
satellites may well have been caused by debris damage.* Perhaps the
of the surface area of the spacecraft, its altitude, and the time it spends in space.
30. Additional collisions are listed at TECHNICAL REPORT, supra note 11, at 9.
31. See ESA HANDBOOK, supra note 3, at 2.2-1.
32. See Limperis, supra note 19, at 319.
33. See Seymour, supra note 9, at 896; see also Smith, supra note 14, at 53-54.
34. See Seymour, supra note 9, at 896.
35. See TECHNICAL REPORT, supra note 11, at 10; see also Smith, supra note 14, at
50.
36. See ESA HANDBOOK, supra note 3, at 8.0-1. The Space Shuttle has had to
engage in evasive maneuvers approximately once every ten missions.
37. See id.
38. These debris detectors include the NASA Long-Duration Exposure Facility,
or LDEF (which showed over 30,000 penetrations) and the Mir Environmental
Effects Payload, or MEEP. See NASA, SETAS Homepage (visited Mar. 4, 2000)
<http://setas-www.larc.nasa.gov>.
39. See TECHNICAL REPORT, supra note 11, at 9.
40. See Seymour, supra note 9, at 896; see also James P. Lampertius, The Need for
an Effective Liability Regime for Damage Caused by Debris in Outer Space, 13 MICH.
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most telling indication of the high probability of collision is the
prediction made by NASA that the International Space Station
stands a one-in-five chance of being critically damaged by debris
during its first ten years in orbit.4
Not only is the threat posed by orbital debris real, but it is also
increasing. Debris volume has grown by three to five percent every
year and will continue to increase due to vigorous space activity.
42
One project that promises to add considerably to orbital congestion is
the proposed deployment of multiple satellite constellations to
optimize wireless global communication.43 The proposed Teledesic
constellation will surround the Earth with 288 satellites.' 4 Fourteen
other constellation projects have been proposed by companies such as
Hughes and General Electric.45  These projects could add
approximately 700 new satellites to "regions of peak debris density. '
The effect on the orbital debris threat will be two-fold. First, the
placement of more satellites in the path of orbital debris will increase
the probability of collision. Second, the deployment of these
constellations will itself increase the debris population by creating
operational debris and, if any mishaps occur, fragmentation debris.
Computer-modeling programs predict that even if only a fraction of
the proposed constellation projects are successfully implemented, the
number of catastrophic collisions in orbit will triple by the year 2050.'7
The United States government also intends to accelerate the
testing of its orbital missile interception system, known as the
National Missile Defense.' When conducting these tests, the
government first launches an ICBM.49  A second rocket is then
J. INT'LL. 447,458 (1992).
41. See Limperis, supra note 19, at 326. NASA intends to employ over two
hundred shields to protect the space station from debris. See TECHNICAL REPORT,
supra note 11, at 35.
42. See Smith, supra note 14, at 53.
43. See ESA HANDBOOK, supra note 3, at 4.2-1.
44. See id.
45. See id. at 4.2-3.
46. Id. at 4.2-1.
47. See id. at 4.2-2.
48. See Seymour, supra note 9, at 893-94, 903 n.92; Lampertius, supra note 40, at
462.
49. See Seymour, supra note 9, at 893-94, 903 n. 92; see also Robert Bums,
Crucial Anti-Missile Defense Test Today, S.F. CHRON., Jan. 18, 2000, at A4; Jim
Abrams, House Backs Missile Defense System, Sends Bill to Clinton, BOSTON GLOBE,
May 21, 1999, at A15.
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launched that carries the experimental exoatmospheric kill vehicle
(EKV) into orbit. As the rocket nears the target missile, the EKV is
released and collides with the ICBM in orbit." The resulting
explosion releases vast amounts of fragmentation debris.
This increased space activity may bring about the most
frightening future scenario of all: the Kessler effect, also known as the
"cascade effect."'" The Kessler effect describes a point in time when
the volume of space debris will become so great that one collision will
trigger a cataclysmic chain of self-perpetuating collisions. 2 These
collisions will eventually produce an impenetrable cloud of
fragmentation debris that will encase Earth. This is a worst case
scenario that would make space travel, as one commentator has put
it, "a thing of the past" and would obstruct our dream of colonizing
outer space.53 If no concerted international action is taken to reduce
debris, it will only be a matter of time before the critical volume is
reached. In the absence of aggressive debris reduction, critical mass
will be achieved first in the highly congested LEO.' Although
computer modeling cannot generate precise predictions, critical mass
in LEO may occur within the next one hundred years.5 Once
collisions begin, it will be impossible to stop the chain reaction.56 In
the event that cascading does occur, the use of space will be derailed
for hundreds of years until the debris particles are eventually pulled
into the Earth's atmosphere and vaporized.57
H. Registration and Tracking:
"Identified" vs. "Unidentified" Debris
Debris is "identified" if the international community knows who
is responsible for launching it into space. Identification requires that
the launch of the object be duly registered and that the object be
continuously tracked in orbit. Several powerful Earth-based tracking
50. See Burns, supra note 49.
51. ESA HANDBOOK, supra note 3, at 4.6; see also Berkley, supra note 25, at 431;
Seymour, supra note 9, at 914.
52. See ESA HANDBOOK, supra note 3, at 4.6.
53. Seymour, supra note 9, at 914.
54. See ESA HANDBOOK, supra note 3, at 4.6-1. For a definition of LEO, see
discussion supra note 21.
55. See ESA HANDBOOK, supra note 3, at 4.6-2.
56. See id. at 4.6-1.
57. See id. Orbital lifetimes in LEO can span several hundred years.
[Vol. 24:125
2000] Unidentified Orbital Debris: The Case for a Market-Share Liability Regime 133
stations are currently tracking almost 10,000 objects in orbit." These
stations use either optical technology, i.e. telescopes, or radar to track
debris.59 Radar technology is superior to telescopes not only because
radar is far more sensitive (and therefore allows detection of smaller
debris) but also because radar, unlike telescopes, can operate during
the day as well as during inclement weather.'
The United States Space Command (USSPACECOM) and its
Russian counterpart have used tracking technology to catalogue
space objects since Sputnik was launched in 1957.6 These entities,
however, do not track debris smaller than ten centimeters in
diameter. 62 Therefore, the vast majority of space debris, which is
composed of fragments less than ten centimeters in diameter, has
been left "unidentified."
This failure to track smaller objects cannot be attributed to a lack
of technology. The United States government's Haystack, Haystack
Auxiliary (HAX) and Goldstone radar facilities have the ability to
detect debris as small as 5 millimeters in diameter in orbit 1000
kilometers above Earth.6 The government entities have simply
drawn the line at ten centimeters and do not track smaller objects.
However, even if the United States government decided to use the
HAX to track smaller objects, this would not necessarily mean that
the government would be able to identify the "owners" of small
debris. The origin of small debris is virtually impossible to determine
because the fragments are typically created by explosions and
collisions between larger debris in orbit. The orbits have become a
soup of debris fragments that collide and create new smaller
fragments which then shoot off in various directions. Keeping track
of who owns each particle of debris would be a task of overwhelming
complexity. As explained in the following section, this inability to
identify the origin of smaller debris poses a serious challenge to the
current international liability regime.
58. See TECHNICAL REPORT, supra note 11, at 5-8.
59. See id. at 4,7.
60. See id. at 4, 6.
61. See id. at 5.
62. See id.
63. See id. at 6-7. An experimental radar system under development in Germany
may be able to detect objects in orbit that are no larger than a speck of dust. See id.
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II. Liability Under Current International Law
Four international agreements govern outer space activities:
(1) the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the
Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other
Celestial Bodies6' (Outer Space Treaty), (2) the Agreement on the
Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts and the Return of
Objects Launched into Space' (Rescue and Return Agreement),
(3) the Liability Convention, and (4) the Convention on Registration
of Objects Launched into Outer Space' (Registration Convention).
As we shall see, the spirit of these agreements suggests that the
launching state has perpetual responsibility for any damage caused by
its space objects. Nevertheless, the current treaty regime fails to
provide a fair compensation mechanism for damage caused by debris.
This lacuna is most glaring with respect to damage caused by
unidentified debris.
The Outer Space Treaty was the international community's first
effort to assign liability for space activities. Article VII states that
"each state party to the treaty that launches or procures the launching
of an object into outer space ... is internationally liable for damage
[caused] by the object or its component parts."67  However, the
absence of any clear standard of liability renders this provision so
vague as to be practically worthless. The treaty also fails to create a
procedural mechanism for seeking compensation.6' Another
weakness, which recurs in later treaties, is the vague definition of
"space object." This term may only encompass active spacecraft and
satellites while excluding defunct objects such as debris.69 On the
other hand, commentators have argued convincingly that the term
"object" has a broader meaning that may include man-made debris
64. Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration
and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, Jan. 27,
1967, 18 U.S.T 2410, T.I.A.S. No. 6347, 610 U.N.T.S. 205 [hereinafter Outer Space
Treaty].
65. Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts and the
Return of Objects Launched into Space, April 22, 1968, 19 U.S.T. 7570, T.I.A.S. No.
6599, 672 U.N.T.S. 119 [hereinafter Rescue and Return Agreement].
66. Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space, Jan. 14,
1975, 28 U.S.T. 695, T.I.A.S. No. 8480, 1023 U.N.T.S. 15 [hereinafter Registration
Convention].
67. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 64, art. VII.
68. See Limperis, supra note 19, at 330.
69. See id. at 333.
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because the provision mentions "component parts."7 Despite the
vague nature of the liability provision, it does give the impression that
a launching state should be perpetually liable for any and all damage
caused by its space objects.7'
Article IX of the Outer Space Treaty also requires states to avoid
"harmful contamination" of outer space.' This provision reveals an
international awareness that space use could cause hazardous
environmental conditions, such as debris pollution, and suggests that
the launching state is responsible for reducing these hazards.
Similarly, the Rescue and Return Agreement requires a state "to take
effective steps.., to eliminate possible danger of harm [by its space
objects when they are returned to Earth]."73 Although this obligation
does not extend to objects still in space, the provision suggests that
states have a continuing responsibility for defunct objects.74
The Liability Convention was enacted in 1972 to elaborate on the
extent and nature of a state's liability for damage caused by its space
objects. The liability scheme imposed by the Convention has two
prongs: Article II renders a state strictly liable for all damage caused
by its space objects that occurs either on Earth or in airspace, while
Article III creates fault-based liability for all damage that occurs in
orbit.75 The Convention also provides that the injured state can
submit a claim for damages directly to the launching state.76 If the
states fail to reach a resolution, Article XIV calls for the appointment
of a Claims Commission to arbitrate the matter.?
The Liability Convention has a number of weaknesses which
have been addressed in recent legal literature. First, it is still not clear
that "space object" includes debris and therefore the question
remains whether the Convention extends to damage caused by orbital
debris.7 ' The definition of "space object" provided in Article I,
70. Smith, supra note 14, at 55.
71. See id. at 57.
72. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 64, art. IX.
73. Rescue and Return Agreement, supra note 65, art. V.
74. See Seymour, supra note 9, at 899-900.
75. Liability Convention, supra note 6, arts. II, III. Article III states that "[iun the
event of damage being caused elsewhere than on the surface of the earth to a space
object of one launching State or to persons or property on board such a space object
of another launching State, the latter shall be liable only if the damage is due to its
fault or the fault of persons for whom it is responsible." Id. art. III.
76. Id. art. IX.
77. Id. art. XIV.
78. See Limperis, supra note 19, at 331.
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however, includes "component parts of a space object."79  This
language may support an interpretation bringing debris damage
within the scope of the Convention.' Second, the Convention lacks a
clear standard of care for determining when a state would be liable
for damage.8 ' The vague wording of the Convention leaves
unanswered certain questions regarding the duty of the launching
state and how a breach of that duty would occur.82 For example,
would the launching state be liable if damage to a third party results
from the launching state's failure to follow construction guidelines?'
And is the fault standard objective or subjective?"4 The third and
most troublesome flaw, a flaw which this Note attempts to cure, is the
Convention's failure to assign fault in those cases where the
destructive object cannot be identified.' This issue is the sword onto
which the Liability Convention will ultimately fall. Unidentified
debris poses the greatest risk of damage in outer space and yet the
Convention provides no compensation to its victims.'
The Registration Convention makes the fault-based liability
scheme more effective by aiding in the identification of space objects.
Article II requires states to keep a registry of all objects launched into
space.' In theory, powerful tracking systems will then keep track of
registered objects after launch. Thus, any objects involved in an
orbital collision will be instantly identifiable and the party "at fault"
will be liable. The Convention also urges states with tracking
capabilities to assist others in tracking their space objects.'
Unfortunately, compliance with the convention has been poor.o A
larger problem is that these provisions help assign liability only
insofar as an object can be tracked and, as explained above, most
orbital debris cannot be tracked.' Therefore the Liability
Convention, even when assisted by the provisions of the Registration
79. Liability Convention, supra note 6, art. I.
80. See Berkley, supra note 25, at 440.
81. See Lampertius, supra note 40, at 456-57.
82. See id. at 456.
83. See Smith, supra note 14, at 58.
84. See Lampertius, supra note 40, at 456.
85. See id. at 455.
86. See id. at 459.
87. Registration Convention, supra note 66, art. II.
88. Id. art. IV.
89. See Lampertius, supra note 40, at 460.
90. See discussion supra Part II.
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Convention, does not provide a compensatory mechanism for damage
caused by unidentified debris.
IV. Two Previously Proposed Solutions:
Insurance and the Liability Pool
As the damage caused by unidentified orbital debris increases,
the cost of space use will increase correspondingly. If international
law does not allocate this cost to the responsible parties, the injured
parties will be forced to absorb the cost. At some point, this cost will
be so great that space ventures will become prohibitively expensive
and any hope of private industry in space will evaporate. The
challenge is to design a mechanism for internalizing the cost of
unidentified debris so that the burden on innocent space venturers is
lifted and private industry can flourish. In addition to market-share
liability, which will be discussed in the next section, legal
commentators have proposed two mechanisms for providing
compensation to parties damaged by unidentified orbital debris: (1)
insurance, and (2) a "liability pool." Neither of these mechanisms,
however, provides an acceptable solution to the debris problem.
The less attractive of the proposed solutions is insurance.9
Insurance could be purchased to cover any damage caused by
unidentified debris. This is a palatable solution for the time being
since the risk may be spread, for instance, among a number of
satellite owners. As long as the pool of insured satellite owners is
large enough, the insurance premiums will be affordable. However,
as the debris population grows, the premiums will rise with the
probability of collision. Eventually, the insurance premium itself will
become a significant barrier to entering the space industry. More
importantly, the insurance solution is unsatisfactory because it does
not internalize the cost of harm caused by debris but only spreads the
cost among the parties at risk.92
Commentators have also proposed the creation of an
international compensation fund, or "liability pool."'93 Each launching
entity would contribute to the fund in proportion to the amount of
debris that its mission would be likely to create. The fund would then
91. See Smith, supra note 14, at 64-66.
92. See id. (synopsis of various satellite insurance provisions).
93. Lawrence D. Roberts, Addressing the Problem of Orbital Space Debris:
Combining International Regulatory and Liability Regimes, 15 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L.
REv. 51, 70 (1992).
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be used to pay compensation for any damage caused by unidentified
orbital debris. While this solution does internalize the costs of debris,
it does so imperfectly due to the impossibility of determining prior to
launch how much debris an individual mission will create. There are
many unforeseen events that may result in debris creation. For
example, a navigator on Earth may make an error when guiding a
satellite to its orbit. If a collision results and thousands of new debris
fragments are created, according to the per-launch schema, the
company will not have to pay more into the fund at that point.
Therefore, the cost of that new hazard created by the collision is not
internalized. It is also unfair to charge a launching entity for damage
which has not yet, and may never, occur. For example, a given
company may launch, operate, and then retrieve a satellite without
the creation of any significant amounts of debris. That company
would have already paid into the liability pool even though it
ultimately made no contribution to the debris hazard.
Furthermore, if instituted now, a liability pool funded by a per-
launch fee would be sorely underfunded for many years to come. It
would take several years for the pool to collect the funds needed to
meet the demands for compensation. If a string of collisions were to
occur early on, the fund would be quickly depleted. One
commentator has suggested that contributions for prior space
pollution should be demanded from the United States government
and other polluters in order to build a sufficient pool of funds
quickly." Such a request would most likely be rejected out of hand.
V. Market-Share Liability as a Solution
Market-share liability provides the only fair and effective
solution to the unidentified debris problem." This theory of liability,
which was created in the context of a pharmaceutical case in 1980 by
the California Supreme Court,96 holds each party liable in proportion
to its contribution to the dangerous condition.' The application of
this theory of liability to the unidentified debris problem was first
94. See id.
95. See generally GLENN H. REYNOLDS & ROBERT P. MERGES, OUTER SPACE:
PROBLEMS OF LAW AND POLICY 177 (1989); Lampertius, supra note 40, at 466;
Roberts, supra note 93, at 70-73; Berkley, supra note 25, at 440; Limperis, supra note
19, at 339-41.
96. See Sindell v. Abbott Lab., 26 Cal. 3d 588, 607 P.2d 924, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132
(1980).
97. See discussion infra Part V.A.
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proposed in 1989 by Professors Glenn Reynolds and Robert Merges."
Recently, this idea has enjoyed a resurgence in space debris
scholarship. Two articles published in 1992 touted the idea as a
possible solution to the unidentified debris problem. 9 In 1997,
Richard Berkley again put forth market-share liability as a potential
solution.1" Most recently, Peter Limperis made a forceful argument
for the application of market-share liability to orbital debris.'
Despite the popularity of market-share liability, none of the
commentators mentioned above has explored the feasibility of
applying the theory to orbital debris.
A. A Brief History of Market-Share Liability
Market-share liability first emerged in a tort case in which the
plaintiffs suffered harmful side effects from diethylstilbesterol (DES),
a synthetic form of estrogen."n During the thirty-year period between
1941 and 1971, the drug was administered to pregnant women for the
purpose of preventing miscarriage. 3  Over two hundred
pharmaceutical companies manufactured the drug during this
period." It was later discovered that women whose mothers had
ingested DES suffered a high incidence of vaginal and cervical cancer
as a side effect of the drug.105 However, due to the passage of time
and, more importantly, due to the fungible nature of the product, the
victims were unable to identify the specific manufacturer that
produced the pills prescribed to their mothers."6 Because the pills
were perfectly substitutable, pharmacists routinely filled prescriptions
for DES with pills produced by any of the two hundred
manufacturers." This inability to create a clear causal link between
the harm and a particular manufacturer raised a new challenge for the
California Supreme Court.
The court in Sindell first considered, but ultimately rejected,
98. See REYNOLDS & MERGES, supra note 95, at 177.
99. Lampertius, supra note 40, at 466; Roberts, supra note 93, at 70-73.
100. See Berkley, supra note 25, at 440.
101. See Limperis, supra note 19, at 339-41.
102. See Sindell, 26 Cal. 3d at 593.
103. See id.
104. See id. at 602.
105. See id. at 594.
106. See id. at 595, 610.
107. See id. at 595.
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three traditional tort theories of multiple causation.' The first of
these theories was "alternative liability," which had been espoused
previously by the court in Summers v. Tice."° In Summers, the
plaintiff had been hit by buckshot after two hunters fired shotguns
simultaneously in his direction."' Because both defendants were
negligent and both were in a better position than the plaintiff to
determine who fired the harmful bullet, the court shifted the burden
to the defendants to absolve themselves of blame individually.'
Under this theory, if the defendants are unable to isolate the liable
party, all defendants are held jointly and severally liable."2
The court in Sindell refused to apply alternative liability to the
DES situation for two reasons. First, the drug manufacturers had no
special information that would have given them an advantage over
the plaintiffs in determining which company had made the pills
ingested by each plaintiff's mother."' Second, the probability that an
individual drug manufacturer had actually produced the drug ingested
by each plaintiffs mother was very low, unlike the situation in
Summers where a fifty percent probability existed that each of the
defendants had fired the harmful bullet."4 Therefore, the court
concluded that it would be unfair to hold a company jointly liable for
harm it most likely did not cause."'
The second approach rejected by the court in Sindell was the
theory of "concert of action liability.".. 6 Under this theory, multiple
tortfeasors can be held jointly liable for the actions of the group if
they collaborated, either expressly or implicitly, in committing a
tortious act, or else knowingly provided substantial assistance in the
commission of the tort."'7 The court found no such collaboration or
common plan among the various drug manufacturers and rejected
this theory of liability."8
Finally, the court in Sindell refused to find the defendants liable
108. Id. at 598-610.
109. Summers v. Tice, 33 Cal. 2d 80, 199 P.2d 1 (1948).
110. Id. at 82.
111. See id. at 86.
112. See id. at 88.
113. Sindell, 26 Cal. 3d at 601.
114. Id. at 602-03.
115. See id. at 603.
116. Id. at 603-06.
117. See id. at 604.
118. See id. at 605.
[Vol. 24:125
2000] Unidentified Orbital Debris: The Case for a Market-Share Liability Regime 141
under the theory of "enterprise liability.""1 9 Enterprise liability, also
known as "industry-wide liability," requires that each of the
manufacturers follow the safety guidelines issued by a central trade
association."z In such cases, the individual manufacturers in effect
shift their responsibility for ensuring the safety of their product onto
the trade organization.' When such an organization is negligent in
the formulation of safety standards and these inadequate standards
result in the production of goods that cause harm, each of the
manufacturers is held jointly liable." However, because no such
centralized trade organization existed in the DES industry, the court
in Sindell dismissed this theory of liability."z
Having rejected these traditional theories of liability, yet being
unwilling to let the victims go uncompensated, the court decided to
create a novel tort theory. The court explained that the realities of
the modem marketplace, replete with fungible products, demanded a
new theory of liability that would permit victim compensation
without requiring the identification of a specific tortfeasor.'24 Under
this new theory, later dubbed "market-share liability," the court held
that each of the drug manufacturers would be liable in proportion to
their share of the DES market.' ' Each company's resulting liability,
the court reasoned, "would approximate its responsibility for the
injury caused by its own products."'' 6 The court permitted an
individual defendant company to exculpate itself by proving that its
product could not possibly have caused harm." In fact, one
defendant in Sindell succeeded in exculpating itself by showing that it
did not begin producing the drug until after the victims were born."
Since the decision by the California Supreme Court in Sindell,
the high courts of several states have adopted market-share liability.
129
The high courts of Washington, New York and Florida applied
119. Id. at 607-10.
120. Id. at 607-08.
121. See id.
122- See id.
123. Id. at 609.
124. See id. at 610.
125. See id. at 612.
126. Id.
127. See id.
128. Id. In the DES cases, the victim was harmed as a fetus as a result of
medication taken by the mother.
129. See Christina Bohannan, Note, Product Liability: A Public Policy Approach
to Contaminated Factor VIII Blood Products, 48 FLA. L. REV. 263, 284 n.146 (1996).
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market-share liability in DES cases similar to Sindell.' ° Taking
market-share liability beyond the context of DES for the first time,
Hawaii's Supreme Court adopted market-share liability to
compensate plaintiffs who contracted the human immunodeficiency
virus (HIV) from a tainted blood product manufactured by a number
of companies.'
When the Wisconsin Supreme Court was faced with a DES case,
it ostensibly rejected market-share liability but then applied another
theory of liability, "risk contribution liability," which differed only in
name from market-share liability.32  The court held that a
manufacturer of DES should be held liable for damages on the
grounds that it had contributed to the risk posed by the drug.33
Other jurisdictions have refused to accept market-share
liability.'"4 The high courts of Missouri, Iowa, Illinois and Ohio have
rejected market-share liability on the basis of one or more of the
following criticisms: (1) the theory abolishes the common law
requirement of a clear causal link, (2) the task of determining market-
share is difficult and can lead to the unfair apportionment of liability,
and (3) market-share liability is a form of social engineering best left
to the legislature.'35 For the same reasons, the First and Third Circuits
have refused to hold paint manufacturers liable under a market-share
theory for brain damage in children caused by exposure to lead
paint.136
130. See id.; see also Martin v. Abbott Lab., 689 P.2d 368 (1984); Hymowitz v. Eli
Lilly & Co., 539 N.E.2d 1069 (N.Y. 1989); Conley v. Boyle Drug Co., 570 So. 2d 275
(Fla. 1990). A federal court in Massachusetts has also applied market-share liability
in a DES case. See McCormack v. Abbott Lab., 617 F. Supp. 1521 (D. Mass. 1985);
see generally Andrew B. Nace, Note, Market Share Liability: A Current Assessment of
a Decade-Old Doctrine, 44 VAND. L. REV. 395,407 (1991).
131. See Smith v. Cutter Biological, Inc., 823 P.2d 717 (Haw. 1991); see also
Bohannan, supra note 129, at 264-65, 284 n.146.
132. Collins v. Eli Lilly Co., 342 N.W.2d 37 (Wis. 1984); see also Suzanne Ernst
Drummond, DES and Market Share Liability in Ohio-A Lesson in How What You
Don't Know Can Hurt: Sutowski v. Eli Lilly, 696 N.E.2d 187 (Ohio 1998), 67 U. CIN.
L. REV. 1331, 1341-42 (1999).
133. See Drummond, supra note 132, at 1341.
134. See id. at 1342-43.
135. See Zafft v. Eli Lilly & Co., 676 S.W.2d 241, 244 (Mo. 1984); Mulcahy v. Eli
Lilly & Co., 386 N.W.2d 67, 70 (Iowa 1986); Smith v. Eli Lilly & Co., 560 N.E.2d 324,
328-29 (Ill. 1990); Sutowski v. Eli Lilly & Co., 696 N.E.2d 187, 190 (Ohio 1998); see
also Drummond, supra note 132, at 1342-43; Kenneth R. Lepage, Lead-Based Paint
Litigation And The Problem Of Causation: Toward A Unified Theory Of Market
Share Liability, 37 B.C. L. REV. 155, 175-76 (1995).
136. See Santiago v. Sherwin-Williams Co., 782 F. Supp. 186, 188 (D. Mass. 1992),
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Although market-share liability has been most successful in the
context of DES cases, plaintiffs have made attempts to apply the
theory to other areas of product liability. As mentioned above, the
Hawaii Supreme Court adopted market-share liability to permit the
recovery of damages for a tainted blood product. California has also
applied the theory to allow compensation for victims of a defective
polio vaccine.137 Efforts to extend market-share liability to health
problems caused by asbestos and lead paint have failed so far.'38
Potential areas of tort litigation that may in the future lend
themselves to market-share liability are cases targeting tobacco
companies and gun manufacturers.'39 One reason for the infrequent
use of market-share liability outside of the DES cases is that truly
fungible products are rare."O
B. The Application of Market-Share Liability to Orbital Debris
Orbital debris poses an unusual liability problem that resembles
the challenge faced by the California Supreme Court in Sindell. Like
DES tablets, small fragments of space debris are indistinguishable, i.e.
debris is fungible. When unidentified debris causes damage, the
specific party responsible for producing the harmful debris fragment
cannot be identified. As in the DES cases, the current debris threat
demands a creative solution. The fault-based scheme of the Liability
Convention may work in those instances when the debris is identified,
but when the debris is untrackable, the owner cannot be identified,
fault cannot be attributed, and thus liability cannot be assigned. A
form of market-share liability, however, can circumvent this problem
of identification.' Under such a scheme, each launching entity,
whether public or private, will be partially liable for any damage
caused by unidentified debris in proportion to the percentage of the
unidentified debris population for which it is responsible.'42
aff'd, 3 F.3d 546 (1st Cir. 1993); City of Philadelphia v. Lead Indus. Ass'n, 994 F.2d
112, 115 (3d Cir. 1993); see also Lepage, supra note 135.
137. See Morris v. Parke, Davis & Co., 667 F. Supp. 1332 (C.D. Cal. 1987); see also
Nace, supra note 130, at 416-18.
138. See Nace, supra note 130, at 414-16; Lepage, supra note 135, at 175.
139. See Robert L. Rabin, Enabling Torts, 49 DEPAULL. REv. 435,452 (1999).
140. See Nace, supra note 130, at 416 n.164.
141. Perhaps "risk-contribution liability" would be a more appropriate name since
there is no market in space debris. Nonetheless, I will use the phrase "market-share
liability" for the sake of simplicity.
142. See Limperis, supra note 19, at 340.
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Who then would pay for damage caused by unidentified debris?
Under the market-share scheme, the liability for such damage will fall
almost exclusively on the United States and Russia for a long time to
come. These states are the great pioneers in space use but they are
also the primary contributors to the debris problem. The United
States and Russia have sent over ninety percent of all catalogued
space objects into orbit.'43 The remaining portion is attributable to
thirty-six other states and private entities."
The greatest obstacle to extending market-share liability to
orbital debris is the difficulty in determining the contribution of each
spacefaring state and private entity to the existing debris hazard. The
total unidentified debris population can be estimated by sampling
methods and mathematical models, but it is impossible to determine
with any precision what portion of that population is attributable to
the activities of a particular state. In the DES cases, the courts were
able to calculate the market-share of each of the defendant drug
manufacturers by simply measuring the volume of medication each
defendant sold at the time the victims purchased the drug.'" Sales
records provided fairly precise evidence of market-share. But even
with the sales records in hand, the court in Sindell still showed some
concern that exact calculation of market-share was not possible and
might therefore lead to an unfair apportionment of liability.'46
Despite these misgivings, the court felt that the risk of unfairness was
acceptable because the risk was, in essence, no different from the risk
of misapportionment of liability that results when a jury is asked to
determine liability in cases involving comparative fault.' 7
When extending market-share liability to orbital debris, the
central question is whether the risk of unfair apportionment of
liability is too great. In other words, can a state's contribution to the
unidentified debris hazard be calculated with acceptable accuracy?
The answer is yes. Although it is impossible to identify the owner of
each particle of debris, there are measurable indices that would allow
us to approximate with some accuracy each state's contribution to the
total unidentified debris population. The possible indices that might
143. See ESA HANDBOOK, supra note 3, at 2.1-3. For the sake of simplicity, this
Note assumes that Russia will take responsibility for space debris created by the
former U.S.S.R.
144. See id.
145. See, e.g., Sindell, 26 Cal. 3d at 612.
146. Id. at 613.
147. See id.
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be used for this purpose are (1) the number of operational objects
each state currently has in orbit, (2) the total number of objects each
state has placed in orbit, and (3) the number of identified debris
fragments currently in orbit for which each state is responsible. Of
these three possible indices, we should use the one that would provide
the most accurate estimate of each entity's contribution to the
unidentified debris population.
The first index, based on existing operational objects in orbit,
bears virtually no relation to the unidentified debris population. If,
for example, the United States were to deorbit all of its current
spacecraft and satellites, it would own zero percent of the operational
objects in orbit. If the operational vehicle index were then used to
determine "market-share," the United States' market-share would be
zero and the United States would thus be immunized from liability
for unidentified debris damage. This would clearly be unfair because
the United States is a primary contributor to space debris.
The second option would give a more reliable indication of
unidentified debris risk contribution. Because every mission creates
debris and objects in LEO can remain in orbit for hundreds of years,
the number of missions launched by each state since 1957 should, it
seems, provide a fairly accurate indication of each state's contribution
to orbital debris. This index, however, has two distinct flaws. First,
not every space mission creates the same amount of debris. Second, it
is difficult to determine how much of the debris created in the year
1961, for instance, remains in orbit and how much has reentered
Earth's atmosphere. Therefore, the number of missions launched has
only a tenuous connection to the current debris population.
The third possible index, based on the number of identified
debris fragments currently in orbit, is the best indicator of
unidentified debris market-share. Unidentified debris is composed
largely of fragmentation debris created by the collision and explosion
of larger debris bodies.1" Larger debris, in effect, becomes smaller
debris. Therefore, if a state is responsible for creating a large portion
of the known body of large debris, it is also likely that the same state
is responsible for creating an equal portion of the unidentified debris
fragments.
Assuming that the third option is selected as the index of a state's
contribution to the unidentified debris population, the remaining
148. See discussion supra Part I.A.
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steps for determining liability would be simple. The first step would
be to determine each state's contribution to the identified debris
population (hereinafter "contribution index") using current
catalogues of identified debris. We would then assume that each state
has contributed in the same proportion to the unidentified debris
population. The USSPACECOM catalogue can provide the figures
for these calculations. 149 As of December 31, 1997, the catalogue
showed that the total number of identified debris fragments was
6186.150 Of these, the United States owned 3272 objects, which make
up 52.9% of the total population, thus giving the United States a
contribution index of 52.9%.5 Russia was identified as being
responsible for 2526 fragments, or 40.8% of the total population.52
Responsibility for the remaining 6.3% of the fragments was divided
among ten other states and entities.' 3
When unidentified debris causes damage in orbit, the
contribution index of each state and private entity would be used to
allocate liability. This process is straightforward: if a satellite suffers
$10,000,000 of damage, the United States would be liable for 52.9%
of the costs, or $5,290,000. Other states and private entities would be
similarly liable in proportion to their share of the identified debris
population.
As in the DES cases, exculpation will be possible if a spacefaring
state or private entity can prove that it could not possibly have
produced the debris that caused the damage. Such exculpation would
be difficult but is conceivable under certain circumstances. Imagine,
for instance, that a space station was pierced by a large fragment of
unidentified debris that left a hole half a meter wide. It would be
clear that the fragment must have had a diameter of approximately
fifty centimeters. A state that had sent only a few satellites into orbit
and had closely tracked all pieces of its debris over ten centimeters
would be able to exculpate itself by showing that the large debris for
149. See ESA HANDBOOK, supra note 3, at 2.1-3.
150. See id.
151. See id.
152. See id.
153. These ten states and entities are the ESA with 197 fragments (3.2%), the
People's Republic of China with 103 fragments (1.7%), Japan with 58 fragments
(0.9%), France with 16 fragments (0.3%), India with 4 fragments (<0.1%), Italy with
3 fragments (<0.1%), Australia with 2 fragments (<0.1%), Germany with 1 fragment
(<0.1%), the United Kingdom with 1 fragment (<0.1%), and Iridium with 1 fragment
(<0.1%). See id.
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which it was responsible was nowhere near the point of collision.
This opportunity for exculpation will provide an additional incentive
for states to track debris closely. States might also exculpate
themselves by means of chemical analysis. This method would
require that the damaged object be retrieved from space in order to
test for any traces that the debris fragment may have left behind.
These tests would reveal the exact chemical composition of the
fragment. States could then exculpate themselves by showing that
they had never launched anything made of that material into space.
C. The Benefits of Market-Share Liability
Market-share liability will benefit the space industry by (1)
providing compensation to the injured party where none existed
before, (2) creating an incentive for states to mitigate debris
production, (3) creating an equal incentive to remove existing debris,
(4) promoting the registration and tracking of space objects, (5)
encouraging states to cooperate in the prevention of collisions, and
(6) ultimately lowering the economic barrier to entering the space
industry.
The immediate benefit of market-share liability will be the
creation of a compensation system where none now exists. Currently,
the victims of unidentified debris damage must absorb the cost of any
collision while the parties who created the debris incur no liability. A
market-share liability amendment will fill this gap in the Liability
Convention.
Of greater importance in the long run is the fact that market-
share liability would create an incentive for states to reduce the
production of large debris. The production of trackable debris will
increase a state's contribution index and, hence, its liability exposure.
Launching entities would therefore take measures to minimize large
debris production in order to minimize liability. Venting excess fuel,
for example, would reduce the risk of explosions in orbit." A state
can also reduce its contribution index by deorbiting defunct satellites.
This can be achieved by either retrieving the satellites or by
propelling the "dead" satellites into the Earth's atmosphere so that
they are vaporized. 5
Market-share liability will not only promote debris mitigation
154. See Seymour, supra note 9, at 911.
155. See id.
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measures but also encourage the improvement of debris removal
technologies. Entities will be able to reduce their contribution index,
as explained above, by removing debris that is already in orbit.
Currently, debris can be removed by sending the Space Shuttle to
retrieve defunct satellites. Other options include using an Earth-
based laser to push objects out of their orbits so that they reenter the
Earth's atmosphere and are destroyed. The Orion laser is currently
being developed for this purpose by the United States government.'56
One commentator has even suggested using a "giant Neff ball" to
catch debris, in effect "sweeping" the orbits clean.57 Those states and
private entities that do not have easy access to debris retrieval
technology or do not have a laser of their own would be able to buy
these services from the United States.
The United States and Russia, as well as other states, would also
have a two-fold incentive to improve their systems for registering,
tracking, and cataloguing space objects. First, states would strive to
improve their tracking capabilities so that they would be able to show
that another state owned a specific debris fragment that caused
damage. Once the responsible state is identified, only that state
would be liable. Second, the United States and Russia would be
eager to identify as many pieces of debris as possible that belong to
each other. The United States, for example, would want to increase
the number of catalogued fragments identified as Russian. By doing
so, the Russian contribution index would grow and the contribution
index of all other states would simultaneously fall. Improvements in
tracking capabilities would be beneficial because they would allow a
fairer apportionment of liability and would assist in debris evasion.
Spacefaring states would also make efforts to improve debris
evasion technology out of the fear of incurring liability. After all, the
most effective method of avoiding liability is to ensure that collisions
do not occur. More effective evasion capabilities could be achieved
by establishing a communications system whereby states with tracking
facilities, such as the United States, could warn other states when
their satellites or spacecraft were in the path of approaching debris.
Upon receiving this information, the spacecraft owner would be able
to engage in evasive maneuvers. This warning system could make use
156. See Smith, supra note 14, at 66-67.
157. Seymour, supra note 9, at 908. The aerogel substance used in the MEEP
program to capture debris may be suitable for this purpose although implementation
of such a program would, at the moment, be prohibitively expensive. See id.
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of sensitive ground-based debris detection technology as well as
debris-detecting satellites.'
Ultimately, market-share liability would lower the economic
barrier to entering the space industry. The costs associated with
unidentified debris damage would be reallocated to those who
created the hazard. This internalization of costs would eliminate a
burden which would otherwise crush private space ventures. The
costs of engaging in the space industry would drop dramatically and
the risks of debris-related damage would also become more
predictable, thus allowing companies to plan confidently for the
future.159 The private space industry would therefore be able to
expand unfettered and the accompanying benefits of private
enterprise would follow.
D. The Weaknesses of Market-Share Liability
Along with its many benefits, market-share liability would also
present a number of challenges that may threaten its success. These
challenges include (1) the creation of a perverse incentive to halt all
debris tracking, (2) the possibility that the international community
may consider market-share liability unfair, (3) the weak incentive to
reduce small debris, (4) possible weaknesses in the incentive to
mitigate the production of large debris, (5) the expense of debris
mitigation measures, and (6) political opposition from the United
States and Russia. Although this list is long, cogent counter-
arguments or simple solutions exist in each case.
Using a state's contribution to the existing identified debris
population as the index for determining liability may create a
perverse incentive for states to scale down their debris tracking
activities. Since liability would be tied to the number of debris
fragments whose ownership is known, states may try to reduce their
liability simply by halting their efforts to identify debris. However,
because several nations would soon be engaged in debris detection,
the desire of each of these states to increase the risk-contribution of
other states (and thereby reduce their own contribution) would cause
each of them to track each other's debris aggressively. The sum of
this multinational effort would easily offset the perverse incentive to
158. See TECHNICAL REPORT, supra note 11, at 11. These debris detection
satellites could use detection technology such as that currently employed by the MSX
spacecraft which has already been placed into orbit by the United States.
159. See Berkley, supra note 25, at 428.
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reduce tracking one's own objects.
The international community may also complain that market-
share liability is unfair because it relies on rough estimates of each
state's contribution to the unidentified debris population. However,
as discussed above, estimates of risk contribution based on certain
indices will have to suffice and these estimates will probably be close
enough to the real figures to avoid gross unfairness."W Some countries
may also raise the objection that the market-share analysis does not
take into account the possibility that naturally occurring meteoroids
could have caused the damage. In response, proponents of market-
share theory can argue that it would be highly unlikely for an orbital
collision to involve a meteoroid because meteoroids pass through the
orbits very quickly before burning up in the Earth's atmosphere.6
Opponents of market-share liability may also contend that the
market-share scheme creates only a weak incentive to reduce
unidentified debris, i.e. debris that is too small to track. Because a
state's contribution index is based on the volume of identified debris
created by that state, the creation of unidentified debris will not
increase a state's liability exposure. Therefore, no incentive to
mitigate small debris, such as paint chips or lens caps, will exist. In
response to this complaint, one could argue that an incentive to
reduce small debris will arise out of a state's desire to minimize the
probability of future collisions for which it would be partly liable.
Moreover, once tracking technology improves, it will become possible
to assign ownership to smaller pieces of debris such as lens caps. At
that point, an ejected lens cap will be catalogued as identified debris
and will increase the launching state's contribution index. This will
create an incentive to mitigate small debris. In the meantime, in
order to ensure maximum reduction of small debris, the United
Nations should require that states follow guidelines for mitigating
operational and microparticulate debris.62
Another potential problem with market-share liability stems
from the fact that states and private entities that have contributed
only a negligible amount to the debris population will continue to
160. See discussion supra Part V.B.
161. See Limperis, supra note 19, at 322; see also Seymour, supra note 9, at 893.
162. The guidelines should require spacecraft to be designed in ways that minimize
debris. The absence of paint on external surfaces, for example, would eliminate paint
chipping. Using non-explosive bolts and carefully avoiding the ejection of objects
into space would reduce operational debris. See Seymour, supra note 9, at 910; see
also Smith, supra note 14, at 61.
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have a very small contribution index for many years to come. The
European Space Agency, for example, is responsible for only a small
share of existing debris and this share will not increase by much until
the agency launches hundreds of objects. Therefore, the European
Space Agency would not have an incentive to make efforts to
mitigate debris knowing that it would be liable for only a very small
percentage of any damages awarded. Just as the risk contribution of
smaller space programs will not increase, the contribution indices of
the United States and Russia will remain high for years to come
regardless of how much they try to mitigate debris. This might
discourage these states from working to reduce debris since their
current liability exposure will persist for years despite any efforts at
mitigation. NASA may see little benefit in attempting to reduce
debris and throw up its hands in frustration. Mandatory international
guidelines for debris mitigation, however, would remedy this
potential problem.
Another danger is that certain states may decide that the current
risk of collision is too small to warrant concern. As a result, these
states may not be compelled by the fear of liability to mitigate debris
production." This would again have the effect of transferring the
costs of orbital debris onto future generations who will inevitably be
harmed if current space users do not take remedial action. The
international enforcement of debris mitigation guidelines will help to
solve this problem by compelling debris reduction when the specter of
potential liability is not enough.
Although market-share liability would lower the barrier to
market entry by reducing the costs related to debris damage, it may
also create a new economic barrier by requiring companies to spend
large amounts of money on debris mitigation.16' Companies would be
compelled to implement debris mitigation techniques by either the
fear of incurring liability or by the fact that mitigation would be
required by supplemental laws. Designing satellites with debris-
minimizing features, such as special boosters to deorbit the satellite at
the end of its lifespan, would place an extra financial burden on
companies. It must be kept in mind, however, that the cost of
mitigation measures is minor when compared to the future costs of
frequent collisions that the space industry will have to face if no such
measures are taken.
163. See Roberts, supra note 93, at 71.
164. See Smith, supra note 14, at 69-70.
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The greatest threat to the implementation of market-share
liability is sheer political opposition." If a number of satellites are
destroyed by unidentified debris, the cost to the United States and
Russia could easily run into the billions of dollars. Why then would
these states ever agree to implement such a system? The answer to
this lies once again in the benefits of private enterprise. If the United
States and Russia agree to pay for their fair share of debris damage, it
will allow private industry to thrive in space. The benefits resulting
from the free market (lower prices, more reliable technology, etc.)
would become available for the governments of the world to enjoy as
much as for the private individual. The United States and Russian
governments must look forward to the day when they will be able to
lease space on a private orbiter at a reasonable rate. In this way,
private enterprise will ultimately save these governments money.
In the meantime, the United States and Russia may be required
to pay large amounts in compensation for damage caused by orbital
debris. A reorganization of the NASA budget would make this
possible without placing any further economic burdens on the United
States government. The government should begin to phase out
portions of its orbital programs and allow private industry to take its
place. The money that is now earmarked for the Space Shuttle and
other programs should be used to pay for any debris damage suffered
by private enterprises. We are at a crossroads in history when private
industry must replace government in space. NASA and the Russian
Space Agency have achieved a marvelous feat by opening space to
humankind. Now it is time for these agencies to step aside and help
private companies to take their place in space.
VI. A Proposed Amendment to the Liability Convention
In order to implement market-share liability for damage caused
by unidentified debris, Article III of the Liability Convention must be
amended. The following proposal for amending the convention
imposes a market-share theory of liability and creates a mechanism
for its implementation. The proposed definition of space debris is
borrowed, with some modifications, from the Technical
Subcommittee for UNCOPUOS.' 66 Proposed additions to Article III
are in italics while strikethiratigh indicates deleted matter.
165. See Limperis, supra note 19, at 342; REYNOLDS & MERGES, supra note 95, at
177; Lampertius, supra note 40, at 466; Seymour, supra note 9, at 903.
166. See supra note 13.
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Article III
1. In the event of damage being caused elsewhere than on the
surface of the Earth to a space object of one launching State or to
persons or property on board such a space object by an identified
space object belonging to of another launching State, the latter shall
be liable only if the damage is due to its fault or the fault of persons
for whom it is responsible.
2. In the event of damage being caused elsewhere than on the
surface of the Earth to a space object of one launching State or to
persons or property on board such a space object by unidentified
orbital debris, each spacefaring State will be liable for the damage in
proportion to that State's recognized contribution to the total
identified orbital debris population unless that State is able to
exculpate itself.
3. For the purposes of this Article:
(a) "Identified" means that the State responsible for placing the
object in orbit is known;
(b) "Unidentified" means that the State responsible for placing the
object in orbit is not known;
(c) "Debris" means all man-made objects, including their fragments
and parts, whether their owners can be identified or not, that are non-
functional with no reasonable expectation of their being able to
assume or resume their intended functions or any other functions for
which they are or can be authorized;
(d) A State's "recognized contribution to the total identified orbital
debris population" will be calculated in accordance with the current
combined space debris data provided by those States that track
debris;
(e) A State can "exculpate" itself by proving that the debris that
caused the damage could not possibly have originated from any of its
space objects or missions.
As discussed above, the United Nations should also adopt
mandatory debris reduction regulations alongside the amendment in
order to ensure maximum debris reduction.167 Such regulations
should require that states (1) design spacecraft in accordance with
debris mitigation guidelines, (2) use their best efforts to track and
167. See discussion supra Part V.D.
Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
identify debris, (3) warn other states when a collision risk arises, (4)
vent excess fuels to reduce the probability of explosion, and (5)
deorbit defunct objects."
Conclusion
Space debris threatens our future in outer space. Thousands of
fragments scream through the orbits at terrific speeds causing damage
to operational satellites and spacecraft with ever-increasing
frequency. This threat of expensive damage will stifle the growth of
private industry in space unless companies are protected from the
costs related to debris. The solution to this problem requires that
these costs be internalized so that they are not borne by innocent
parties.
Internalization can be achieved by assigning liability to the party
that created the harmful debris. The fault-based compensation
mechanism adopted in the Liability Convention adequately assigns
liability when identified debris causes damage, but the Convention
fails to assign liability in cases where the debris is unidentified.
Under the Convention, fault cannot be assigned unless the owner of
the harmful debris is identified. This limitation leaves a gaping hole
in the Convention because the vast majority of space debris eludes
identification.
To remedy this shortfall, this Note proposes an amendment to
the Liability Convention that applies a form of market-share liability
when unidentified debris causes damage in orbit. Under the
amendment, each state would be liable for any damage caused by
unidentified debris in proportion to its contribution to the debris
hazard. Market-share liability would energize the private space
industry by lowering the economic barrier to market entry. Although
the costs of market-share liability would, at first, fall heavily on the
governments of the United States and Russia, a robust private space
industry would ultimately benefit the governments. Ultimately,
market-share liability will allow private industry to usher in a new
space age.
168. The guidelines could be modeled on NASA's Guidelines and Assessment
Procedures for Limiting Orbital Debris. For a description of NASA's guidelines see
Seymour, supra note 9, at 905; see also supra note 162.
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of the events that made those six years go by so quickly. I will also
reflect on the implications of the work of the Tribunal.
I. The Operation of the Tribunal
Although far from perfect, the Yugoslav Tribunal, or the ICTY,
and its sister institution, the International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda, or ICTR,5 have addressed the greatest gap in international
humanitarian law: the failure to enforce the comprehensive legal
regime enhanced after World War II which was designed to protect
basic human rights during armed conflict.
Yet, when the judges first met in November 1993, the Tribunal
was hardly equipped to meet this challenge; instead, at that time the
Tribunal existed only as U.N. Security Council Resolution 827, which
established it on May 25, 1993. Let me give you a short overview of
the structure of the Tribunal.
The Statute, adopted by the Security Council, sets forth the
framework for the Tribunal's operation. There are three organs: the
Chambers, the Prosecutor and the Registry. The Chambers, initially
comprised of two trial chambers of three judges each, was increased
in 1998 to three trial chambers. Unlike the Nuremberg and Tokyo
tribunals, there is an Appeals Chamber. It consists of five judges.
The Appeals Chamber also hears appeals from the Rwanda Tribunal.
The Yugoslav Tribunal is given competence to try persons for serious
violations of international humanitarian law. It has subject matter
jurisdiction over grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 1949,
violations of the laws or customs of war, genocide, and crimes against
humanity.
The Tribunal is ad hoc, that is, it was established solely for the
conflict in the former Yugoslavia. The trials are conducted by judges
without a jury. The Statute directs the judges to adopt rules of
procedure and evidence for the conduct of the proceedings and the
protection of victims and witnesses. The Prosecutor is independent
and responsible for initiating the investigation and submitting the
indictment to a judge who determines whether a prima facie case has
been established. The third organ, the Registry, is responsible for
servicing both the Chambers and the Office of the Prosecutor.
National courts have concurrent jurisdiction but the Tribunal,
5. The ICrR was formed by the Security Council to address violations of
international humanitarian law in Rwanda during 1994. S.C. Res. 955, U.N. SCOR,
49th Sess., 3453d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (1994).
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established by the Chapter Seven powers of the Security Council, has
primacy, giving it the authority to request national courts to defer to
the competence of the Tribunal.
The accused is guaranteed internationally recognized rights,
including the presumption of innocence and the right to be tried in his
presence. The maximum penalty that may be imposed by the
Chamber is life imprisonment. If the accused is found to be guilty, he
serves his sentence in a state that has agreed to accept convicted
persons from the Tribunal. States are required to cooperate with the
Tribunal, including the arrest or detention of persons. If a state fails
to cooperate, the President may report this non-compliance to the
Security Council for appropriate action.6
All of this was on paper; but in 1993, in reality, the judges were
the Tribunal. The court had no premises, no rules and no one in
custody. Moreover, the first Prosecutor selected decided he did not
want the job after all and the U.N. could not agree on his replacement
until nine months later; as a result, Richard Goldstone came on board
some fifteen months after the Tribunal was established.
Despite these obstacles, the judges went to work in loaned space
in the Peace Palace, where the International Court of Justice sits.
Our first task was to draft the Rules. Over four months, we merged
elements of common and civil law into 129 rules. Their application
has produced the first comprehensive international code of criminal
procedure. Being uniquely charged with providing rules for the
protection of victims and witnesses and as the first judicial body
specifically mandated to try crimes of sexual violence under
international law, we developed significant measures to protect the
identity of witnesses without infringing on the rights of the accused to
a fair trial. This balancing of the rights of victims and the accused was
an extraordinary challenge and a major accomplishment for a
criminal judicial institution.
Even after adopting the rules and procedures for the Tribunal, it
was still many months before any of us went near a courtroom,
6. See Resolution 827, supra note 4, 4; Statute of the International Tribunal,
Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security Council
Resolution 808 (1993), U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., Annex, art. 29, U.N. Doe. S/25704
(1993), available at http://www.un.orglicty/basic/statutlstatute.htm (May 13, 1998)
[hereinafter ICTY Statute]; Rules of Procedure and Evidence, International Criminal
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, rules 7bis, 11, 13, 59, 61, U.N. Doc. IT/32/Rev. 18
(2000), available at http:lwww.un.orglictylbasiclrpe/lT32_revl8con.htm (July 14,
2000).
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established by the Chapter Seven powers of the Security Council, has
primacy, giving it the authority to request national courts to defer to
the competence of the Tribunal.
The accused is guaranteed internationally recognized rights,
including the presumption of innocence and the right to be tried in his
presence. The maximum penalty that may be imposed by the
Chamber is life imprisonment. If the accused is found to be guilty, he
serves his sentence in a state that has agreed to accept convicted
persons from the Tribunal. States are required to cooperate with the
Tribunal, including the arrest or detention of persons. If a state fails
to cooperate, the President may report this non-compliance to the
Security Council for appropriate action.6
All of this was on paper; but in 1993, in reality, the judges were
the Tribunal. The court had no premises, no rules and no one in
custody. Moreover, the first Prosecutor selected decided he did not
want the job after all and the U.N. could not agree on his replacement
until nine months later; as a result, Richard Goldstone came on board
some fifteen months after the Tribunal was established.
Despite these obstacles, the judges went to work in loaned space
in the Peace Palace, where the International Court of Justice sits.
Our first task was to draft the Rules. Over four months, we merged
elements of common and civil law into 129 rules. Their application
has produced the first comprehensive international code of criminal
procedure. Being uniquely charged with providing rules for the
protection of victims and witnesses and as the first judicial body
specifically mandated to try crimes of sexual violence under
international law, we developed significant measures to protect the
identity of witnesses without infringing on the rights of the accused to
a fair trial. This balancing of the rights of victims and the accused was
an extraordinary challenge and a major accomplishment for a
criminal judicial institution.
Even after adopting the rules and procedures for the Tribunal, it
was still many months before any of us went near a courtroom,
6. See Resolution 827, supra note 4, 4; Statute of the International Tribunal,
Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security Council
Resolution 808 (1993), U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., Annex, art. 29, U.N. Doc. S/25704
(1993), available at http://www.un.org/icty/basic/statut/statute.htm (May 13, 1998)
[hereinafter ICTY Statute]; Rules of Procedure and Evidence, International Criminal
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, rules 7bis, 11, 13, 59, 61, U.N. Doc. IT/32/Rev. 18
(2000), available at http://www.un.org/ictylbasic/rpelIT32_revl8con.htm (July 14,
2000).
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principally because none existed and there were no Prosecutors.
However, by late 1994, the Office of the Prosecutor had a skeletal
staff. Prosecution lawyers had reviewed evidence collected by the
Commission of Experts, which had been created by the Security
Council prior to the establishment of the Tribunal to investigate
events in the former Yugoslavia.7 The Prosecutor also received
sufficient supplementary information to present the first indictment,
charging an alleged commander of a detention camp in eastern
Bosnia and Herzegovina with war crimes and crimes against
humanity. On November 4, 1994, Dragan Nikolic became the first
person to be indicted by the Tribunal.8
However, it was not until early 1995, two years after its creation,
that the Tribunal secured custody of an accused-Dusko Tadic. As
the case proceeded to the courtroom, it also triggered the further
development of the Tribunal's institutional structure: a detention unit
to hold the accused, monitored by the ICRC; detention regulations;
and an international legal aid system. Adding to this, by the end of
1995, the Tribunal had already made significant substantive
contributions to international jurisprudence. Particularly notable are
the Appeals Chamber findings in October 1995, made in response to
Tadic's preliminary motion challenging the legality of the
establishment of the Tribunal and its subject matter jurisdiction
The first full trial began on May 7, 1996. I was the presiding
judge and the other two members of the Chamber were Ninian
Stephen of Australia and Lal Chand Vohrah from Malaysia. The
opening day was a real media event. Over 300 reporters were on
hand. Two red tents served as their headquarters and almost made
for a circus-like atmosphere. The public gallery, separated from the
courtroom by a bulletproof floor-to-ceiling glass, was filled to its 150-
seat capacity. After a few days, however, most of the press left. I am
told that they were looking for more "blood and gore" than the
7. S.C. Res. 780, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3119th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/780
(1992).
8. Prosecutor v. Nikolic, Indictment, No. IT-94-2 (ICTY Nov. 4, 1994)
(amended Feb. 12, 1999), available at http:llwww.un.orglicty/indictment/english/nik-
ii941104e.htm.
9. Prosecutor v. Tadic, Decision on the Defence Motion on Jurisdiction (Rule
73), No. IT-94-1 (ICTY Trial Chamber Aug. 10, 1995), available at
http:llwww.un.org/icty/tadic/trialc2/decision-e/100895.htm; Prosecutor v. Tadic,
Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, No. IT-94-
1 (Appeals Chamber Oct. 2, 1995), available at
http:llwww.un.orglicty/tadic/appealldecision-e/51002.htm.
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Prosecutor's case initially offered. The Prosecutor's case instead
began with a professor who gave a detailed history lesson about the
Balkans that consumed days of testimony. Thereafter, the trial went
on for eighty-six days, spanning a six-month period, however,
primarily because the single courtroom had to be shared for other
proceedings. We heard from over 125 witnesses and admitted over
300 exhibits.'0 Many important issues were raised and decided, which
set the tone for the trials to follow. These issues included the
handling of hearsay (it is admissible in the proceedings),1 dealing
with the conflicting interests of protecting witnesses from harm while
preserving an accused's right to a fair trial12 and handling the
disclosure of documents between the parties. 3
From a broader perspective, however, what is of signal
importance is that the Tadic trial gave the Tribunal the first
opportunity to apply the Rules-especially the rules of evidence-in
a way that protected the accused's right to a fair trial, thereby
demonstrating that international criminal justice was possible.
Notwithstanding this important milestone, the Tribunal
continued to be bedeviled by the refusal of some states in the former
Yugoslavia to cooperate with the Tribunal, a recalcitrance which
continues to some extent to date. By way of example, while over
seventy people had been indicted by mid-1997, only eight were in
custody. States were reluctant to provide staff or funds, declined to
order the 60,000 peacekeepers in Bosnia to assist what few
investigators the Prosecutor had, and, it had been said, refused to
provide it the intelligence information that would have allowed the
investigation of those who instigated and directed the violence. The
situation was so bad that Professor Ted Meron, one of the Tribunal's
biggest supporters, suggested that the international community
10. See ICTY Trial Information Sheet: Tadic Case, No. IT-94-1 (Dec. 8, 2000),
available at http://www.un.org/ictylglanceltadic.htm.
11. See Prosecutor v. Tadic, Decision on Defence Motion on Hearsay, No. IT-94-
1 (ICTY Trial Chamber Aug. 5, 1996) (on file with ICTY).
12. See Prosecutor v. Tadic, Decision on the Prosecutor's Motion Requesting
Protective Measures for Victims and Witnesses, No. IT-94-1 (ICTY Trial Chamber
Aug. 10, 1995), available at http://www.un.orglicty/tadic/trialc2/decision-
e/100895pm.htm.
13. See Prosecutor v. Tadic, Decision on the Prosecution Motion to Compel
Disclosure of Statements Taken by the Defence of Witnesses Who Will Testify, No.
IT-94-1 (ICTY Trial Chamber May 7, 1996) (on file with ICTY); Prosecutor v. Tadic,
Decision on Prosecution Motion for Production of Defence Witness Statements, No.
IT-94-1 (ICTY Trial Chamber Nov. 27, 1996), available at
http://www.un.org/ictyltadic/trialc2/decision-e161127ws2.htm.
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should support the court or shut it down. 4
In these early years, the Tribunal was a victim of the tension
between the perceived demands of peace and justice. The Tribunal's
creation was simultaneously an act of hope, desperation and cynicism
by an international community lacking a coherent policy to respond
to the carnage inflicted in the former Yugoslavia. Its mandate was to
help restore international peace and security, but the logical
implication of this-the indictment and trial of the most senior
officials considered to be the primary perpetrators-also was
considered an unacceptable risk to the peace process.
In mid-1997, the Tribunal was given at long last the enforcement
support it lacked. At that time, a small but influential group of states
seemingly adopted a policy of what I have called collective activism
by pushing for the arrest of indictees. The U.N. force in Croatia and
then NATO in Bosnia began detaining indictees,S and the United
States assisted in securing the surrender of ten accused from Croatia.
In the final six months of 1997, the population of the Tribunal's
detention unit jumped from eight to twenty-two.
This period of unprecedented growth coincided with my election
as President of the court in November 1997. The efforts of my
predecessor, Antonio Cassese, were focused on ensuring the
Tribunal's survival. During his term as President, there were few
detainees and the infrastructure was being developed to function as a
court of law. However, I was elected one month after ten Bosnian
Croats surrendered.
The quickening pace of arrests and surrenders necessitated
further rapid expansion. Over a five month period, I joined the
ribbon-cutting ceremonies for two courtrooms and the three new
judges I had requested shortly after I was elected President in an
address to the Security Council came on board. The sudden increase
in the number of accused and lawyers and, consequently, hearings,
highlighted the need for more streamlined court processes. Since
their original promulgation, the Rules had been amended as practice
and circumstances revealed gaps but the complexity and legal novelty
of the proceedings still resulted in long delays. Thus, in 1998, we
14. Theodor Meron, Answering for War Crimes, FOREIGN AFF. J., Jan. 1997, at 2.
15. This resulted from a combination of factors, including a change of
government in the United Kingdom, the appointment of Madeleine Albright as the
U.S. Secretary of State, the lack of progress in the peace process in the former
Yugoslavia, and Prosecutor Arbour's use of secret indictments to reduce potential
risks to NATO forces involved in detention actions.
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began a systematic review of the Rules designed to assure that the
trials were expeditious, recognizing the court's unique evidentiary
and legal nature.
There was also a burgeoning of the Appeal Chamber's docket.
The judges of the Tribunal Appeals Chamber also form the ICTR
appellate court. Due to the low number of accused in custody and the
narrow grounds of appeal, 6 the first ICTY appeal was submitted in
mid-1995 7 and the ICTR Appeals Chamber was first called to
consider a matter in mid-1998. 8 By March 2000, however, the
appellate judges had a docket of over forty ICTY and ICTR matters.
This growth was fuelled by the addition of one trial chamber, which
resulted in an increase in the proceedings being conducted, as well as
the steady expansion of grounds of appeal. While this figure
represents a normal, or even light, workload for a national court, it
swamped the Tribunal.
The heavy workload was not limited to the Appeals Chamber;
the trial judges were also overloaded. In part, this was because some
trial judges temporarily were called upon to sit on appeals (and vice
versa) as well.'9 The complexity of the cases, both at the trial and
appeals level, exacerbated the problem. Thus, in my final address to
the General Assembly, I raised a concern that the Tribunal may not
16. The statutes permit appeals from either party on (i) an error of law
invalidating the impugned decision, (ii) an error of fact that has occasioned a
miscarriage of justice, or (iii) an application for review of a decision if new facts
emerge which could have been a decisive factor in reaching the impugned decision.
Rule 72(B) of the Tribunal's Rules of Procedure and Evidence allows an
interlocutory appeal as of right from decisions on preliminary motions challenging
jurisdiction and upon goodcause being shown. ICTY Statute, arts. 25, 26; Statute of
the International Tribunal for Rwanda, S.C. Res. 955, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3453d
mtg., Annex, arts. 24-25, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (1994), available at
http:lwww.ictr.orglENGLISHlbasicdocslstatute.html.
17. Prosecutor v. Tadic, Decision on Jurisdiction, supra note 9.
18. See Summary of Appeals Chamber Decision on Appeals Against the
Decision of the Trial Chamber Rejecting the Defence Motions to Direct the
Prosecutor to Investigate the Matter of False Testimony by Witnesses "CC" and "E,"
(referencing Prosecutor v. Rutaganda, Notice of Appeal Against the Decision of
Trial Chamber I Dismissing the Defence Motion for an Order to the Prosecutor to
Investigate a Case of False Testimony (Witness "CC"), No. ICTR-96-3-A (Mar. 26,
1998)), available at
http://www.ictr.org/ENGLISHIcases/Rutagandadecisions/sum980608.htm.
19. For example, Judge Shahabuddeen, Vice-President of the ICTY and member
of the Appeals Chamber of the ICTY and ICTR, sat on Trial Chamber I conducting
the trial of Tihomir Blaskic. Prosecutor v. Blaskic, Judgment, No. IT-95-14 (ICTY
Trial Chamber Mar. 3, 2000), available at
http://www.un.orglictylblaskic/trialcl/judgement/index.htm.
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be able to provide the accused a fair and expeditious trial. I proposed
that ad hoc (temporary) judges be appointed to help reduce the time
an accused is held before his trial commencesl
More recently, President Claude Jorda-the current president of
the Tribunal-made a similar formal request to the Security Council.
In addition to easing the burden on appellate judges, ad hoc judges
would allow existing trial judges to focus exclusively on trials. In
support of this, President Jorda presented the results of a Tribunal
internal review, in which it was estimated that the Tribunal will not
complete trial proceedings until 2016, with appeals to follow.2 ' Thus,
without additional resources, an accused captured today could wait a
considerable amount of time before the commencement of his trial.
In the United States, retired judges are often called upon to help
with heavy dockets. Ad hoc judges could fulfil the same purpose for
the Tribunal, hearing cases on an as-needed basis. Considering the
extraordinary mandate of the Tribunal, the lack of precedent, t e
complexity of the cases, the Prosecutor's intention to bring more
cases growing out of the Kosovo tragedy and most importantly, the
accused's right to an expeditious trial, this request is warranted.
By 1998, a number of governments were complementing their
newly proactive stance on arrests by their NATO troops with
significant additional staff and funding. While obviously welcome,
this generosity was limited to a handful of members of the
international community. Not only was their largesse finite, but also
the nature of the Tribunal required all states to cooperate.
Moreover, as the number of trials climbed, it became clear that
two other forms of cooperation were critical: witness protection and
enforcement of sentences. Witnesses who testify before the Tribunal
20. Judge Gabrielle Kirk McDonald, President of the ICTY, Address to the
United Nations General Assembly (Nov. 8, 1999), available at
http://www.un.org/icty/latest/latestdev-e.htm. The Expert Group appointed by the
U.N. Secretary General in 1999 to review the operations of the ICTY and ICTR also
advocated such a proposal. See Report of the Expert Group to Conduct a Review of
the Effective Operation and Functioning of the International Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, U.N. GAOR, 54th
Sess., Agenda Items 142-43, 47-48, 108, U.N. Doc. A/54/634 (1999).
21. See Current State of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia:
Future Prospects and Reform Proposals, Report on the Operation of the International
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Submitted by Judge Claude Jorda, President, on
Behalf of the Judges of the Tribunal, U.N. GAOR, 55th sess., Agenda Item 52, 35,
U.N. Doc. A/55/382 (2000); see also Judge Claude Jorda, Report on the Operation of
the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (May 12, 2000),
available at http://www.un.org/icty/pressreal/RAP000620e.htm.
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often put their lives in jeopardy by doing so. Although the Tribunal
has significant protective measures for witnesses while they are at the
Tribunal, it lacks a program that would extend that protection. Thus,
witnesses who would be at risk if they returned to their home must be
relocated to other states.
Further, state assistance is necessary with respect to enforcement
of sentences because the Tribunal does not have a prison. Its
detention unit serves only as a holding facility for those awaiting trial
or appeal and is not equipped for long-term incarceration.
It was therefore imperative to secure state agreement to accept
onto their territory witnesses at risk and convicted individuals who
had exhausted their rights of appeal. After many months and much
negotiating, we were able to reach agreement with several states to
provide this assistance.n
Another obligation of state cooperation is the execution of arrest
warrants. This duty has been honored only in its breach by many
states in the former Yugoslavia, most notably Serbia, Republika
Srpska, and for some time, Croatia. In fact, Milosevic's Serbia not
only refused to execute arrest warrants, it denied the Prosecutor
access to Kosovo for several months and repeatedly failed to comply
with the Tribunal's requests and orders. I wrote to the Security
Council four times and appeared before it twice, urging action to
address this noncompliance, asserting it had now risen to the level of
obstructionism.'
22. Italy, Finland, Sweden, Norway, Austria, France and Spain have signed
agreements for the enforcement of sentences. Security concerns preclude providing
information on states that have agreed to protect witnesses.
23. Letter from Judge Gabrielle Kirk McDonald, President of the ICTY, to His
Excellency Mr. Hans Dahlgren, President of the Security Council (Sept. 8, 1998),
available at http://www.un.orglicty/pressreal/LET980908.htm; Letter from Judge
Gabrielle Kirk McDonald, President of the ICTY, to His Excellency Mr. Jeremy
Greenstock, President of the Security Council (Oct. 22, 1998), available at
http://www.un.orglicty/pressreallp356-e.htm; Letter from Judge Gabrielle Kirk
McDonald, President of the ICTY, to His Excellency, Ambassador A. Peter
Burleigh, President of the Security Council (Nov. 6, 1998), available at
http://www.un.orglicty/pressreal/LET981106.htm; Letter from Judge Gabrielle Kirk
McDonald, President of the ICTY, to His Excellency Ambassador Qin Huasun,
President of the Security Council (Mar. 16, 1999), available at
http://www.un.orglicty/pressreallp386-e.htm; Judge Gabrielle Kirk McDonald,
President of the ICTY, Address to the Security Council (Oct. 2, 1998), available at
http://www.un.orglicty/pressreallp349-e.htm; Judge Gabrielle Kirk McDonald,
President of the ICTY, Address to the Security Council (Dec. 8, 1998), available at
http://www.un.orglicty/pressreal/p371-e.htm.
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Four Security Council resolutions24 reaffirmed the Prosecutor's
right to enter Kosovo and investigate crimes committed there, but the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia continued to flout both the letter and
the spirit of international law. I even raised this issue in my 1998
address to the U.N. General Assembly. I wrote NATO and Contact
Group members; I addressed the Peace Implementation Council that
oversees the Dayton agreement, 6 all to no avail.
Thus, the carnage that erupted in Kosovo should not have come
as a surprise given the international community's failure to see the
writing on the wall. Further, the failure to insist upon the arrest of
General Ratko Miadic and Radovan Karadzic, major figures in the
conflict, created a culture of impunity and negated the deterrent
effect. As a result, those bent on committing horrific atrocities were
emboldened by this absence of accountability.
Allowing those charged with the commission of unspeakable
atrocities to remain in official or unofficial positions of power and
influence was an albatross around the neck of post-conflict recovery.
H. The Implications of the Work of the Tribunal
Nonetheless, there is no question but that the Tribunal now is
making progress in fulfilling its mandate. The first step in achieving a
lasting peace in the region is to identify alleged perpetrators of the
worst abuses and hold them accountable. Included in the thirty-seven
24. S.C. Res. 1160, U.N. SCOR, 53d Sess., 3868th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1160
(1998); S.C. Res. 1199, U.N. SCOR, 53d Sess., 3930th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1199
(1998); S.C. Res. 1203, U.N. SCOR, 53d Sess., 3937th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1203
(1998); S.C. Res. 1207, U.N. SCOR, 53d Sess., 3944th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1207
(1998).
25. Judge Gabrielle Kirk McDonald, President of the ICTY, Address to the
United Nations General Assembly (Nov. 19, 1998), available at
http:/vww.un.org/icty/pressreal/SPE981119.htm.
26. On December 14, 1998, I wrote to the members of the Steering Board of the
Peace Implementation Council overseeing the implementation of the Dayton Peace
Agreement in Bosnia and Herzegovina, advising them of the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia's continuing non-compliance. Letter from Judge Gabrielle Kirk
McDonald, President of the ICTY, to the Peace Implementation Council (Dec. 4,
1998), available at http://vvww.un.org/icty/pressreal/p373-e.htm. I also wrote to the
Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the United Kingdom and France, on February 22,
1999, concerning the nature of provisions in the draft Rambouillet agreement
pertaining to the Tribunal and stressing the need to bind the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia to specific forms of cooperation, such as the recognition of the
competence of the Tribunal and the issuance of visas. Letter from Gabrielle Kirk
McDonald, President of the ICTY, to Foreign Ministers Vedrine and Cook (Feb. 22,
1999), available at http:lwww.un.orglicty/pressreal/p383-e.htm.
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persons currently in custody in The Hague are: Radovan Karadzic's
deputy and the former Bosnian Serb member of the post-war national
Presidency of Bosnia (Momcilo Krajisnik);27 a major political
representative for Bosnian Croats (Dario Kordic);' the generals
allegedly responsible for organizing Serb military operations against
Sarajevo and against Srebrenica (Stanislav Galic, Radislav Krstic);29
the commanders of detention camps in north-western Bosnia; ° and
three men accused of controlling detention facilities and widespread
sexual slavery and other torture in Foca.3' Fifteen persons have been
tried in seven completed trials,32 four cases are on appeal,33 four more
27. See Prosecutor v. Krajisnik, Amended Indictment, No. IT-00-39 (ICTY Feb.
21, 2000) (amended Mar. 21, 2000), available at
http:lwww.un.orglictylindictmentengishkra-laiOO0321e.htm.
28. See Prosecutor v Kordic, Amended Indictment, No. IT-95-14/2 (ICTY Nov.
10 1995) (amended Sept. 30, 1998), available at
http://www.un.orglicty/indictment/englishlkor-lai980930e.htm.
29. See Prosecutor v. Galic, Indictment, No. IT-98-29 (ICTY Mar. 26, 1999),
available at http://www.un.orglicty/indictment/englishlgal-ii990326e.htm; Prosecutor
v. Krstic, Indictment, No. IT-98-33 (ICTY Nov. 2, 1998) (amended Oct. 27, 1999),
available at http://www.un.org/icty/indictment/english/krs-ii981102e.htm.
30. Miroslav Kvocka, Mladen Radic, Milojica Kos, Zoran Zigic and Dragoljub
Prcac. See Prosecutor v. Kvocka, Amended Indictment, No. IT-98-30 (ICTY Nov. 9,
1998) (amended May 31, 1999), available at
http://www.un.org/icty/indictment/english/kvo-1ai981109e.htm; Prosecutor v. Kvocka,
Amended Indictment, No. IT-98-30/1 (ICTY Feb. 13, 1995) (amended Mar. 8, 2000
and Aug. 21, 2000), available at http://www.un.org/icty/indictmentlenglishlprc-
ai000821e.htm.
31. Dragoljub Kunarac, Radomir Kovac and Zoran Vukovic. See Prosecutor v.
Kunarac, Amended Indictment, No. IT-96-23 (ICTY June 26, 1996) (amended July
13, 1998, Sept. 6, 1999, and Dec. 1, 1999), available at
http://www.un.org/icty/indictment/english/kun-3ai991201e.htm; Prosecutor v.
Vukovic, Amended Indictment, No. IT-96-23/1 (ICTY June 26, 1996) (amended Oct.
7, 1999 and Feb. 21, 2000), available at http://www.un.org/icty/indictment/english/vuk-
lai000221-e.htm.
32. Dusan Tadic (Prosecutor v. Tadic, No. IT-94-01); Zejnil Delalic, Hazim Delic,
Zdravko Mucic and Esad Landzo (Prosecutor v. Delalic, No. IT-96-21); Zlatko
Aleksovski (Prosecutor v. Aleksovski, No. IT-95-14/1); Anto Furundzija (Prosecutor
v Furundzija, No. IT-95-17/1); Goran Jelisic (Prosecutor v. Jelisic, No. IT-95-10);
Zoran Kupreskic, Mirjan Kupreskic, Vlatko Kupreskic, Drago Josipovic, Vladimir
Santic and Dragan Papic (Prosecutor v. Kupreskic, No. IT-95-16); Tihomir Blaskic
(Prosecutor v. Blaskic, No. IT-95-14). See Fact Sheet on ICTY Proceedings, available
at http://www.un.org/icty/glance/procfact-e.htm (Mar. 1, 2001) [hereinafter Fact
Sheet].
33. Prosecutor v. Delalic, No. IT-96-21; Prosecutor v. Blaskic, No. IT-95-14;
Prosecutor v. Jelisic, No. IT-95-10; Prosecutor v. Kupreskic, No. IT-95-16. See Fact
Sheet, supra note 32. (On February 20, 2001, subsequent to the presentation of this
paper, the Appeals Chamber affirmed the acquittal of Zejnil Delalic.)
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are ongoingM and nine are in the pre-trial stage.35 Four individuals
have exhausted appeals and are serving or have served their
sentences,36 while ten others are appealing theirs.37 Two individuals
have been acquitted and released.'
However, the numbers seem small, especially by national
standards. Has the Tribunal made a contribution that goes beyond
conducting these trials? I believe that it has. The Tribunal has
expanded the jurisprudence of international humanitarian law.
Secondly, it has demonstrated that the rule of law is an integral part
of the peace process. Third, the Tribunal has proved that
international criminal justice is possible. Further, the Outreach
Program, which I will discuss in a few minutes, offers an important
mechanism to help the reconciliation process.
The Tribunal has considered several significant procedural and
substantive issues. Perhaps one of the most challenging jurisdictional
questions was when the Tribunal was called upon to consider its own
competence to hear a challenge to its competence (it concluded that it
could hear and rule on the challenge). 9 In many instances, the
34. Prosecutor v. Krstic, No. IT-98-33; Prosecutor v. Kordic, No. IT-95-14/2;
Prosecutor v. Kvocka, No. IT-98-30/1; Prosecutor v. Kunarac, No. IT-96-23. See Fact
Sheet, supra note 32. (On February 22, 2001, subsequent to the presentation of this
paper, Trial Chamber II found Dragoljub Kunarac and Radomir Kovac guilty (No.
IT-96-23). On February 26, 2001, Trial Chamber II found Dario Kordic and Mario
Cerkez guilty (No. IT-95-14/2).)
35. Prosecutor v. Kolundzija, No. IT-95-8 (Dusko Sikirica, Dragan Kolundzija
and Damir Dosen); Prosecutor v. Simic, No. IT-95-9 (Milan Simic, Miroslav Tadic,
Simo Zaric and Stevan Todorovic); Prosecutor v. Krnojelac, No. IT-97-25; Prosecutor
v. Galic, No. IT-98-29; Prosecutor v. Vasiljevic, No. IT-98-32; Prosecutor v.
Martinovic, No. IT-98-32 (Vinko Martinovic and Mladen Naletilic); Prosecutor v.
Brdjanin, No. IT-99-36 (Radislav Brdjanin and Momir Talic); Prosecutor v. Krajisnik,
No. IT-00-39; Prosecutor v. Nikolic, No. IT-94-2. See Fact Sheet, supra note 32. (On
October 30, 2000, subsequent to the presentation of this paper, the trial of Milorad
Krnojelac (No. IT-97-25) commenced.)
36. Dusan Tadic (No. IT-94-1); Zlatko Aleksovski (No. IT-95-14/1); Drazen
Erdemovic (No. IT-96-22); Anto Furundzija (No. IT-95-17/1). See Fact Sheet, supra
note 32.
37. Hazim Delic, Zdravko Mucic and Esad Landzo (No. IT-96-21); Goran Jelisic
(No. IT-95-10); Zoran Kupreskic, Mirjan Kupreskic, Vlatko Kupreskic, Drago
Josipovic and Vladimir Santic (No. IT-95-16); and Tihomir Blaskic (No. IT-95-14).
See Fact Sheet, supra note 32.
38. Dragan Papic (No. IT-95-16) was released on January 14,2000; Zejnil Delalic
(No. IT-96-21) was released pending appeal on November 16, 1998. See Fact Sheet,
supra note 32. (On February 20, 2001, subsequent to the presentation of this paper,
the Appeals Chamber affirmed Delalic's acquittal.)
39. See Prosecutor v. Tadic, Decision on Jurisdiction, supra note 9.
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Tribunal's cases are made more challenging by the necessity of
interpreting the language of international documents. In other cases,
the Tribunal has been able to rely on the reasoning of decisions by
other international judicial bodies, particularly with respect to
detention and release of those awaiting trial or decisions on appeal.
Hundreds of decisions have interpreted the Rules of Procedure. One
of the more contentious matters was whether the Tribunal had the
power to issue a subpoena to a state or state official for the
production of documents. The Appeals Chamber held that it could
issue compulsory orders but it was improper to call them subpoenas
except when addressed to private persons.'
Additionally, as trials have been conducted, the ICTY, along
with the ICTR, has taken the important step of defining and
classifying crimes of sexual violence. This is a significant advance in
the international context. Indeed, this represents the first time that
an international court has tried persons for rape, which unfortunately
has long been part and parcel of armed conflicts.4 And this is the first
time an international court has been given explicit jurisdiction of rape
as a crime against humanity.42 Also important are the numerous
decisions on the elements of the crimes of murder, willful killing,
torture, persecution, inhuman and inhumane acts, and willfully
causing great suffering.43  Finally, the decisions on individual
responsibility ensure that those who aid in the commission of a crime
are held accountable as well as the primary perpetrator. These are
only some of the decisions the Tribunal has considered; as more trials
are completed, the jurisprudence will continue to evolve.
Secondly, the Security Council's choice of a court of law as the
measure to help bring about and maintain peace is a victory for the
rule of law, the anchor of civil society. In the Tribunal's early days,
some thought that prosecution of alleged war criminals was
40. See Prosecutor v. Blaskic, Judgement on the Request of the Republic of
Croatia for Review of the Decision of Trial Chamber II of 18 July 1997, No. IT-95-14
(Appeals Chamber Oct. 29, 1997), 25, 46-56, available at
http:/lwww.un.orglictylblaskic/appealdecision-e/71029JT3.html.
41. See Prosecutor v. Furundzija, Judgement, No. IT-95-17/1 (ICTY Trial
Chamber Dec. 10, 1998), 165-189, available at
http://www.un.orglicty/furundzija/trialc2/judgement/index.htm; Prosecutor v. Delalic,
Judgement, No. IT-96-21 (ICTY Trial Chamber Nov. 16, 1998), T 475-496, available
at http://www.un.org/icty/celebici/trialc2/udgement/index.htm.
42. ICTY Statute, supra note 6, art. 5(g).
43. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Tadic, 112 I.L.R. 1 (ICTY 1997), available at
http://www.un.org/icty/tadic/trialc2/judgement/index.htm.
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inconsistent with efforts to bring peace to the region. Now, the goals
of peace and international criminal justice are no longer seen as
mutually exclusive. Rather, they are interdependent and
complimentary.
Third, the Tribunal is now fully functioning, holding trials and
appellate proceedings on a regular basis. Currently, there are over
one thousand people from seventy-five countries involved in
prosecuting and trying crimes committed across the region.
International lawyers locate and interview witnesses and police and
forensics experts exhume gravesites. A coalition of NATO forces
from other states identify, track and detain persons indicted by the
Tribunal and transfer them to the court hundreds of miles away in
The Hague. Thus, the Tribunal has proved that, in practice,
perpetrators of horrific crimes can be held accountable for their
actions, and that it is possible to operate a system of international
criminal justice. Efforts to establish a permanent International
Criminal Court gained considerable momentum because of this
lesson.
Finally, the importance of the Outreach Program cannot be
overstated. Increasing the awareness of and combating the
misinformation about the Tribunal was one of my priorities when I
was elected President. Considering the Tribunal's extraordinary
mandate, I felt that the Tribunal must take affirmative steps to make
its processes and personalities known and understood, especially to
the people in the former Yugoslavia. I must add, however, that apart
from the formal Outreach Program, I also focused on the United
States, where I found so many who neither understood-nor perhaps
cared about-the Tribunal. Thus, I gave more interviews than I often
cared to and spoke about the Tribunal as often as possible in various
forums around the world.
Following much debate, an Outreach Program was finally
established in September 1999.' The United States and the
MacArthur Foundation responded to my personal appeal for funding
and various European states contributed as well. The Program has a
coordinator based in The Hague with offices in Croatia and Bosnia,
through which there are regular contacts with the media and legal and
other groups. To date it has organized weekly television updates on
44. See Lal C. Vohrah & Jon Cina, The Outreach Programme, in EssAYs ON
ICTY PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE IN HONOUR OF GABRIELLE KIRK MCDONALD 547
(Richard May et al. eds., 2000).
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its activities, broadcasted its proceedings, and conducted regular
conferences and exchanges of personnel and information between
The Hague and the region. A major conference, which President
Jorda will attend, is planned to take place shortly in Croatia.
This is only a first step that must be consolidated and expanded.
Unfortunately, the Outreach Program has only managed to secure
funding until the end of this year. There are indications that the
Program has so far had only limited success,4 6 but I believe that it
represents a vital aspect of the Tribunal's work and that it must be
successful. Acknowledging the suffering of victims, vindicating the
rights of communities and affirming individuals' equality are the
cornerstones of the reconciliation process. Thus, the Tribunal's
future depends on working in conjunction with broader initiatives,
including, as the political climate becomes more conducive, the
proposed truth and reconciliation commission for Bosnia.
Conclusion
The critical contribution of the Tribunal has been to foster and
enhance the recognition by states of the need to enforce norms of
international law prohibiting massive violations of human rights.
Judicial mechanisms are now an established element of conflict
resolution, and proposals under discussion around the world envision
a range of international, national and mixed tribunals. Moreover,
following the lead of the Tribunals, the culture of impunity is being
challenged by states whose national courts are applying international
law. The "Pinochet principle 47 is demonstrating that justice has no
45. See Human Rights Center, University of California (Berkeley) & Centre For
Human Rights, University Of Sarajevo, Justice, Accountability and Social
Reconstruction: An Interview Study of Bosnian Judges and Prosecutors (May 2000),
available at http://globetrotter.berkeley.edu:80/humanrights/documents.
46. See Kristen Cibelli & Tamy Guberek, Education for Public Inquiry and
International Citizenship, Tufts University, Justice Unknown, Justice Unsatisfied?
Bosnian NGOs Speak About the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia (2000), available at http://www.epiic.com/class/justicereport.pdf.
47. The arrest of Augusto Pinochet in the United Kingdom in October 1998 and
subsequent decisions by the House of Lords established very important practical and
juridical precedents. The case vindicated the principle that neither an individual's
status nor any putative amnesty can act as a bar to accountability for acts that violate
norms of international law. More recently, negotiations between the United Nations
and the government of Sierra Leone over the establishment of a proposed "Special
Court" to try the perpetrators of such acts have reaffirmed the latter. See Report of
the Secretary-General on the Establishment of a Special Court for Sierra Leone, U.N.
Doc. S/20001915, IT 22-24, (Oct. 4, 2000), available at
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borders. For example, last month the Mexican police arrested a man
alleged to have committed acts of torture and terrorism during the
Argentinean junta twenty-five years ago.' Interestingly, the same
judge who requested Pinochet's arrest and extradition from the
United Kingdom issued the indictment.49 Finally, the International
Criminal Court would not be so close to reality-getting closer every
day, with four ratifications in the last ten days5 -without the
influence of both the ICTY and the ICTR. Both have been involved
in the last four years of treaty negotiations and Preparatory
Commission meetings.
Thus, the judgments of the Tribunal do more than determine the
guilt or innocence of the accused. They do more than establish a
historical record of what transpired. They do more than interpret
international humanitarian law. Rather, the Tribunal's judgments are
evidence of the actual enforcement of international norms. This is the
best proof that the numerous conventions, protocols and resolutions
affirming human dignity are more than promises. These paper tigers
have been given sharp teeth, thus showing that the rule of law can
help with the peace process.
It is clear, then, that we are living through tremendously
encouraging times. Yet, how do we situate the progress of the past
seven years in light of the amount of bloodshed that has flowed
unchecked from Iraq to the former Yugoslavia to Somalia, through
Rwanda, Afghanistan, Burundi, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Colombia, the
Congo, Chechnya, Indonesia and Sudan? I believe that we are in the
midst of a refocusing of the priorities of the international community.
The ICTY and the ICTR have demonstrated that international
criminal law is feasible. The resulting normative expansion has
become an important component in framing policy options in
response to humanitarian crises. In the wake of interventions in
Kosovo and Sierra Leone, we are now seeing tentative efforts to
extend these options from punishment to prevention.5' This is the
http:llwww.un.orglDocslsclreports/2000/915e.pdf.
48. See Tim Weiner & Ginger Thompson, Wide Net in Argentine Torture Case,
N.Y. TIMEs, Sept. 11, 2000, at A6.
49. See id.
50. Lesotho, Botswana, Luxembourg and New Zealand ratified the treaty
September 6-8, 2000, at the U.N. Millenium Summit; Sierra Leone and Gabon
ratified it on September 15 and 21, 2000, respectively. See Coalition for an
International Criminal Court, Rome Signature and Ratification Chart, available at
http:l/www.igc.orglicc/romelhtmllratify.html (last modified Feb. 8,2001).
51. Tony Blair, Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, The Challenge of Reform
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challenge we must all strive to meet.
Thank you.
for the U.N., Speech at the U.N. Millennium Summit, New York (Sept. 6, 2000),
available at http://www.fco.gov.uk/news/speechtext.asp?4116.
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